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B protecting the right to a jury, the state and federal
constitutions recognize the fundamental value of
having civil and criminal disputes resolved by layper-
sons. Actual trials, however, are relatively rare, in part
because parties seek to avoid the risks and cost of trials
and courts seek to clear dockets efficiently. But as desirable as
settlement may be, it can be a difficult way to resolve a dispute.
Parties view their cases from different perspectives, and these
perspectives often cause both sides to be overly optimistic and
to expect unreasonably large or unreasonably small resolutions.
This article describes a novel method of incorporating
layperson perspectives to provide parties with more accurate
information about the value of a case: We suggest that parties
work with mediators or settlement judges to create mini-trials
and recruit hundreds of online mock jurors to render decisions.
By applying modern statistical techniques to these results, the o
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mediators could show the parties the
likelihood of possible outcomes and
collect qualitative information about
strengths and weaknesses for each
side. These data will better inform the
parties' views and should thereby facili-
tate settlement.
SETTLING CASES
Most cases settle. One study examin-
ing two federal district courts found an
average settlement rate of 70 percent,
with large variations based on case type
and venue.' Unfortunately, the settle-
ment process is not easy, and settlement
often does not occur until late in discov-
ery or even until the eve of trial.' Parties
frequently spend a great deal of time
and money before reaching that point.
Earlier settlements would allow parties
to save significant resources and would
lessen the burden on the court system.
To avoid these costs, courts often
push parties to settle. Courts use two
techniques to promote settlement.
First, courts design discovery rules
to force opposing parties to disclose
both their arguments and supporting
evidence early. This prevents trial by
ambush and - most importantly for
our purposes - empowers the parties
to more accurately predict the eventual
outcome of their cases. Furnished with
this information, the parties are more
likely to settle.' After all, why spend
money going to trial when both parties
can already predict the likely outcome?
Second, courts regularly suggest, or
even require, that the parties participate
in some form of alternative dispute reso-
lution (ADR).
Mediation is the most popular form
of ADR.' It is a consensual, confiden-
tial, and problem-solving process that
is intended to facilitate settlement.
In 2012, the Federal Judicial Center
reported that 63 of 94 district courts
authorized judges to require media-
tion.' But mediation is not the only form
of ADR intended to facilitate settle-
ment. Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) is
another, albeit less popular, type of ADR.
ENE uses subject-matter experts to
provide the parties with a second opinion
on the merits of the case. Twenty-three
district courts authorize the use of some
form of ENE .6
Despite liberal discovery rules
and the help of skilled professionals,
opposing parties typically have very
different views on the relative value of
their cases. The existing types of ADR
cannot always bridge that gap. There
are both cognitive and practical reasons
why this is the case. First, studies have
demonstrated that lawyers have overly
optimistic views of case outcomes.
One study asked 481 litigators from 44
different states questions about one of
their pending cases that was expected to
go to trial in the next 6-to-12 months.'
The litigators were asked: "What would
be a win situation in terms of your
minimum goal for the outcome of this
case?" The attorneys were then asked
to estimate the likelihood that they
would achieve that goal or better.9 The
median attorney thought there was a
70 percent likelihood of achieving the
goal. But when the same attorneys were
interviewed after their cases ended (in
settlement or trial), only 56 percent of
the attorneys had achieved their mini-
mum goal." This suggests the litigators
were overly optimistic about their case
outcomes."
It is not just attorneys that over-
value their cases. Studies suggest hat
self-interest skews opposing parties'
evaluations of case value. For exam-
ple, one study randomly assigned 160
students to negotiate on behalf of either
the plaintiff or the defendant in a mock
case.'2 The case involved an injured
motorcyclist that was suing an automo-
bile driver for $100,000. After reading
identical sets of facts, but before nego-
tiating, the students were asked to
predict what a judge would award in the
case and what a fair settlement would be
from the vantage point of a neutral third
party." On average, a plaintiff's predic-
tion of the judge's award was $14,527
higher than a defendant's prediction
($38,953 vs. $24,426), and a plaintiff's
estimate of a fair settlement was $17,709
higher than a defendant's ($37,028 vs.
$19,318)." These results suggest that
different sides may not not be able to
agree on the likelihood of winning or
losing nor the potential damages if the
plaintiff prevails. Studies comparing
settlement offers to outcomes bear out
this problem. Parties often go to trial
and obtain an outcome that is either
only equal or inferior to what they could
have achieved from settlement."
One might expect that mediation or
ENE could counteract each party's opti-
mism bias by giving the parties a realistic
view of the likely outcome. But these
tactics can only do so much to elimi-
nate bias. First, while mediators often
highlight the weaknesses of the parties'
arguments, they rarely give their opin-
ion on the expected outcome. Indeed,
nearly half of attorneys do not think it
is appropriate for mediators to recom-
mend a particular settlement.'" Even
when a mediator does evaluate a case,
parties may not trust the evaluation.
They understand the mediator's primary
goal is to settle the case and often believe
"that the mediator will manipulate how
he or she behaves and what he or she says"
accordingly."' Second, the neutral evalu-
ator is only one person, albeit usually a
very experienced attorney. But no matter
how smart or experienced, one attorney
cannot accurately predict how a jury will
decide. In some ways, the neutral observ-
er's training and experience may actually
make it more difficult to imagine the
case from the perspective of a juror.
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That is why parties have tradition-
ally used mock juries when they want to
understand their own cases. But mock
juries have weaknesses, too. Jury consul-
tants typically recruit 12, 24, or 36
mock jurors. Those numbers are simply
not enough to make a prediction with
any precision. One or two individuals
with extreme views can dramatically
change the apparent value of the case.
That is why Gallup polls never survey
so few people; a larger sample size is
needed to to provide estimates with a
reasonable margin of error.
More than one third of the federal
caseload is in multi-district litigation
(MDL), where hundreds or thousands
of cases raise similar issues, potentially
implicating hundreds of millions, or
billions, of dollars in liability. Typically,
to help resolve these cases en masse,
judges hold a few "bellwether" trials in
front of real juries. While these data-
points are better than nothing, a dozen
individual jurors, or even 144 jurors
across a dozen such trials, are hardly
enough to provide a reliable estimate of
the total liability exposure.
Crowdsourcing can provide larger and
more reliable samples. Crowdsourcing
is the practice of using large numbers
of people over the internet to perform a
task or set of tasks. A variety of platforms
recruit such participants for relatively
small fees." One task these participants
can perform is serving as mock jurors.
In using hundreds of mock jurors, a
basic statistical analysis can provide a far
more precise estimate of case outcomes
than litigants have been able to gener-
ate via other means. Moreover, while
it makes sense for parties to be skepti-
cal of a single neutral's case evaluation,
it is more difficult to doubt the collec-
tive opinion of hundreds of mock jurors.
With the emergence of online crowd-
sourcing, third-party neutrals can obtain
this information relatively quickly and
inexpensively. As this practice becomes
more popular, we hope to replace online
crowdsourcing platforms with prospec-
tive jurors that are part of the venire.
Currently, most of these individuals
typically sit around a jury waiting room
without performing any meaningful
civic service. A more efficient use of their
time would be serving as mock jurors.
Eventually, these individuals may be able
to work remotely, making service more
convenient and less time consuming.
We propose that either a neutral,
mediator, or even the parties alone, can
themselves conduct a mini-trial using
vignettes that represent the particular
facts and law of the case. As in a real
trial, mock jurors can render a verdict
deciding liability and damages.
THE ONLINE TRIAL
This is how it works. The attorneys from
the parties create shortened presenta-
tions of their case, which social scientists
call the "stimulus." This is essentially a
version of what the attorneys provide
to a neutral during a settlement confer-
ence. Depending on how much time and
money the parties are prepared to spend,
there are two primary options. The
more elaborate version involves making
a video. In the video, each side offers a
presentation with narration read by one
of their attorneys.'9 Just like a presen-
tation that an attorney might give to
a neutral, the presentation can include
photographs, documents, animations, or
even videotaped deposition testimony.
This sort of audio-visual presentation
has the advantage of being an immersive
experience for the jurors. We have found
that the core of a case, even if relatively
sophisticated, can often be presented in
about 15 minutes per side.2"
For smaller-stakes cases, the parties
do not have to make videos. They can
simply draft a short statement of their
position. Similar to the video, the
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statement can incorporate important
evidence. The jurors then read the text
and review the excerpts of evidence. To
the extent that there are evidentiary
objections, the neutral can rule on them;
any objectionable evidence and argu-
ments can be excluded from the parties'
presentations. If the neutral is unsure
about how the judge will later rule on a
key admissibility question, the case can
be tried both ways. When the parties'
presentations are ready, the neutral
combines the different sides' presenta-
tions and adds jury instructions.
Next, mock jurors are recruited from
one of several crowdsourcing platforms.
The panel should be broadly represen-
tative of the population of potential
jurors. The parties should offer incen-
tives to ensure that jurors pay attention.
The cost will vary depending on the
length of the mini-trial and the number
of mock jurors. The neutral can adjust
both variables based on the complexity
and value of the case. To take advantage
of modern statistical techniques, we
generally recommend several hundred
mock jurors.2 ' But if the parties simply
want to get a sense of what a jury might
decide, they can elect for a smaller
number. Regardless of how many jurors
are chosen, the cost will likely be far
less expensive than traditional mock
juries. Participants on crowdsourcing
platforms are typically paid minimum
wage or even less.2 2 When the trial only
lasts half an hour, the cost for each mock
juror will be minimal.
Online mock trials can be completed
quickly; the authors have run cases in less
than a week and sometimes in a day. The
results can be provided in easy-to-digest
form. For example, a summary could
state that 324 out of 800 jurors, or 40.5
percent, determined that the defendant
was liable. Those who did find liabil-
ity set damages at an average of $1.42
million dollars, with a 95 percent confi-
dence interval ranging from $450,000
to $3.7 million. The wide range of esti-
mated damages may explain why the
opposing parties have different views of
the potential exposure. A small percent-
age of mock jurors appear to agree with
each side's original intuition about the
outcome. But do the parties want to risk
relying on the remote possibility that a
trial jury will be made of outliers? The
parties will likely feel pressure to reach a
settlement amount that is near the case's
average expected value as estimated by a
mock jury.
We can also calculate a case's
expected value by combining the data
on verdicts and damages: Multiply the
plaintiffs chance of winning by the
average recovery when winning. Here,
the case expected value is $575,100.
Of course, special jury forms can also
impose comparative fault, third-party
fault, or other affirmative defenses to
yield a realistic estimate of case value.
This statistical evidence is far more
information than either a neutral or
traditional mock jury could provide the
parties. It is also less biased than infor-
mation from a neutral. The mock jurors
are not trying to convince the parties
to settle. They are just asked to render
their verdict.
For MDL cases, class actions, or other
sorts of mass actions where there are
systematic variations in the individual
cases, variations can be built into the
trial stimulus. For example, suppose
that some plaintiffs were exposed to a
toxic substance when relatively young,
and other individuals were exposed later
in life, a difference that could affect
causation. A dozen such variations could
be built into the case as a true random-
ized experiment, which would allow the
analyst to produce a more accurate over-
all estimate as to liability and also create
estimates for subgroups within the pool,
just as a public opinion poll can show
overall support for the president and
break out results by political affiliation.
CONCLUSION
Although both neutrals and litigants
may be wary of trying this "new"
approach to valuing cases, they should
take comfort in the fact that the use of
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vignettes is a well-rooted practice in the This is just the beginning. If crowd- decide whether their case should be
social sciences.2" Vignette-based exper- sourcing can estimate case values settled or taken to trial, crowdsourcing
iments are now published in leading for settlement, it can do so for other can provide the answer. Before long,
scientific journals to predict real-world purposes as well. Insurance companies this approach will be a necessary part of
behaviors.2" Such studies also are found can estimate exposures more accurately. every attorney's legal toolkit.
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